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I. INTRODUCTION
The author was hosted by the Shanghai Institute of Foreign Trade to present a series
of high-level lectures on financial law at that institution as well as at Shanghai Jiao Tong
University, Fudan University, China University of Political Science and Law, Peking
University, and Tsinghua University. These lectures, presented in December 2012,
focused on securitization, structured finance, and covered bonds, and they included
related concepts from commercial trusts and shadow banking. This Article integrates the
substance of those lectures.
II. SECURITIZATION'S ROLE IN THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS
The securitization of subprime mortgage loans is widely viewed as a root cause of
the global financial crisis. 3 In the United States, there was significant government
pressure on banks and other lenders to make home-mortgage loans to expand home
ownership, even for risky borrowers.4 These subprime loans were often made, for
example, to borrowers with little de facto income, anticipating that home-value
appreciation would enable the borrowers to refinance to lower-rate mortgages. 5
Historically, home prices had generally been increasing in the United States since the
Great Depression. 6
But this model failed when, in 2007 and 2008, home prices fell significantly.7 In one
sense, the precipitous drop in home prices was unexpected-like Monty Python's skit,
"Nobody expects the Spanish Inquisition."8 In another sense, though, "the fall arguably
should have been anticipated based on the [earlier] liquidity glut and artificially low
interest rates, driving up housing prices artificially." 9
As a result of the fall in home prices, borrowers who were relying on refinancing for
loan repayment could not refinance. 10 Furthermore, many subprime mortgage loans had
adjustable rates, which increased after an initial "teaser" period." Borrowers, some of
whom could not afford the rate increases, had expected to refinance at lower interest
3. For an introduction to securitization, see STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE: A GUIDE TO
THE PRINCIPLES OF ASSET SECURITIZATION (3d ed. 2002); Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset
Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 133 (1994) [hereinafter Alchemy]; Protecting Investors, supra note 2.
4. Protecting Investors, supra note 2. Arguably, the fall was exacerbated by the fact that mortgage




8. Monty Python's Flying Circus: The Spanish Inquisition (BBC television broadcast Sept. 22, 1970)
(describing an unrelated instance when an event was unexpected).
9. Steven L. Schwarcz, Understanding the Subprime Financial Crisis, 60 S.C. L. REV. 549, 551 (2008-
2009) [hereinafter Understanding the Subprime Financial Crisis] (describing the various failures that led up to
the financial crisis).
10. Id at 552-53.
11. How Lending Standard Changes Led to the Housing Boom/Bust, BIG PICTURE (Oct. 21, 2008, 7:21
AM), http://bigpicture.typepad.com/comments/2008/10/why-lending-sta.html (explaining that borrowers for
low teaser rates were searched for and that this contributed to the collapse of 293 mortgage lenders).
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rates.12 Collapsing home prices stymied those expectations.1 3 For these reasons, many
risky borrowers began defaulting. 14 "These defaults in turn caused substantial amounts of
low-investment-grade-rated mortgage-backed securities to default and [the highest]
AAA-rated securities to be downgraded."1 5 This frightened investors, who believed that
"investment grade" meant relative freedom from default, and that "AAA" meant iron-
clad safety. 16 Investors started losing confidence in rating-agency ratings and started
avoiding all types of rated debt securities.17
Fewer investors meant that the price of debt securities began falling.18 "Falling
prices meant that firms using debt securities as collateral had to mark them to market and
put up cash-requiring the sale of more securities-which caused market prices to
plummet further downward in a death spiral."l 9 The U.S. government's refusal in mid-
September 2008 to save Lehman Brothers, and its resulting bankruptcy, added to this
cascade. 2 0 Investors lost all confidence in debt markets, and even the short-term
commercial paper market virtually shut down. 2 1 The lack of debt financing meant that
companies could no longer grow and, in some cases, even survive. That affected the real
economy and led to the global financial crisis. 22
III. ADDRESSING SECURITIZATION'S PROBLEMS
Because of its role in initially triggering the global financial crisis, securitization has
been villainized. 23 But prior to the crisis, and even now, securitization is one of the
12. Understanding the Subprime Financial Crisis, supra note 9, at 551 (describing when borrowers could
not refinance).
13. Id.
14. Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH. U. L. REv. 211, 217
(2009) [hereinafter Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets].
15. Understanding the Subprime Financial Crisis, supra note 9, at 552; see Steve Lohr, In Modeling Risk,
the Human Factor Was Left Out, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2008, at BI (describing how the models failed to keep
pace with the complex securities); Steven L. Schwarcz, The Future of Securitization, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1313,
1323-24 (2009) [hereinafter The Future of Securitization] (explaining that the overuse of securitization models
has caused inaccuracy and thus has increased the uncertainty of investors in regards to securities).
16. Understanding the Subprime Financial Crisis, supra note 9, at 552.
17. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating Agency Paradox, 2002 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1 (2002) [hereinafter Private Ordering ofPublic Markets], available at http://ssm.com/abstractid=
267273 (providing an explanation of rating agencies and their ratings).
18. Understanding the Subprime Financial Crisis, supra note 9, at 552.
19. Id.
20. Id. Also, restructuring can involve difficult decisions. For example, in a mortgage securitization
transaction in which cash flows deriving from principal and interest are separately allocated to different investor
classes, or tranches, a restructuring that reduces the interest rate would adversely affect investors in the interest-
only tranche (and likewise, a restructuring that reduces principal would adversely affect investors in the
principal-only tranche).
21. Understanding the Subprime Financial Crisis, supra note 9, at 552.
22. Id. at 553.
23. Thus, securities backed by financial assets are usually more creditworthy than securities issued
directly by the originators. STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE: A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF
ASSET SECURITIZATION § 1:3 (3d ed. Supp. 2010) (explaining that except for the most highly rated issuers,
securities issued in securitization transactions typically are more highly rated than the issuer's own debt
securities-and that, even where the latter are more highly rated, securitization provides additional market
flexibility to obtain financing).
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primary mechanisms by which companies can obtain financing from the capital markets,
bypassing high-cost intermediaries such as banks-an approach known as
"disintermediation." 24
As a tool for disintermediation, securitization can more precisely allocate risk with
capital, avoiding middleman inefficiencies. It also can enable companies to access capital
markets directly, in most cases at lower cost than the cost of issuing direct debt (such as
bonds or commercial paper). "Moreover, when the securitized assets are loans [such as
mortgage loans], securitization can help to transform the loans into cash from which
banks and other lenders can make new loans."2 5
These positives might be outweighed, however, by securitization's flaws, which
were revealed by the global financial crisis. Whether securitization, even with the flaws,
created net positive value is an unresolved question. My goal in this Article is not to
attempt to answer that question. Instead, I examine how to overcome these flaws.
There are at least five potential flaws: subprime mortgages may be a problematic
asset type that should not have been securitized; the originate-to-distribute model of
securitization might create moral hazard; securitization can create servicing conflicts;
securitization can foster overreliance on mathematical models; and investors in
securitization transactions may over-rely on rating-agency ratings. 26
This Article uses the following terminology. Subprime mortgage loans (also called
subprime mortgages) are loans made to risky borrowers who use the proceeds to purchase
homes and then mortgage the homes as collateral; because the borrowers are risky, the
collateral is the primary source of repayment. 27 "In the most basic form of mortgage
securitization, mortgage-backed securities (MBS) are issued by a special-purpose vehicle
(SPV), and payment on the securities is derived directly from collections on mortgage
loans owned by the SPV."28 In addition:
More complex forms of mortgage-backed securities include collateralized debt
obligation ("CDO") securities in which payment derives directly from a mixed
pool of mortgage loans and sometimes, also, other financial assets owned by
the SPV; and 'ABS CDO' securities in which payment derives from MBS and
CDO securities owned by the SPV (and thus indirectly from the mortgage loans
and other financial assets underlying those owned securities). 29
Subprime mortgage securitization can reference any of these financial products, so long
24. Id.
25. The Future ofSecuritization, supra note 15, at 1315 (2009).
26. STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE: A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ASSET
SECURITIZATION §§ 1:1, 11:1-2 (3d ed. Supp. 2010).
27. Although subprime mortgage loans were sometimes made to affluent borrowers in amounts that may
be difficult for such borrowers to repay, a significant amount of subprime mortgage loans were made to non-
affluent or poor borrowers. To some extent, this followed the U.S. government's strong encouragement of
lenders to make mortgage loans to low-income--often disproportionately minority-borrowers; to some extent,
it also may have reflected greed due to the high interest rates charged to risky borrowers. Understanding the
Subprime Financial Crisis, supra note 9, at 55 1.
28. The Future of Securitization, supra note 15, at 1316; see also Protecting Financial Markets, supra
note 2, at 376-77 (discussing SPVs).
29. The Future of Securitization, supra note 15, at 1316; Private Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating
Agency Paradox, supra note 17, at 2-5, 8.
132 [Vol. 39: 1
Securitization, Structured Finance, and Covered Bonds
as all or a material portion of the underlying financial assets consist of subprime
mortgages.
Next, consider these five potential flaws, examining what went wrong and what
needs to be fixed.
A. Problematic Asset Type
The failure of subprime mortgage securitization was caused by its almost absolute
dependence on home appreciation. 30 Some believe this type of particular sensitivity to
declines in house prices was unique.3 1 "From that perspective, parties structuring
securitization transactions can minimize future problems by excluding, or at least limiting
and better managing, subprime mortgage loans as an eligible type of underlying financial
asset, and also by conservatively assessing the payment prognosis for other types of
financial assets underlying securitizations." 3 2 This is important not only to protect the
integrity of securitization transactions but also to avoid the unintended consequence that
securitization of a problematic asset type can motivate greater origination of that asset
type. However:
This is not to say these procedures will be failsafe. Parties to and investors in
securitization transactions must always be diligent to recognize and try to
protect against the possibility that the underlying financial assets might, as in
the case of subprime mortgage loans, fail in unexpected ways. What would
happen to automobile loan securitizations, for example, if a technological
innovation makes cars obsolete, depriving even financially healthy borrowers
of the incentive to repay their loans? The invention of a new form of personal
transportation is at least as plausible as the idea that home prices-which
generally had only risen since the 1930s-would suddenly collapse in value at
a rate higher than that seen during the Great Depression as happened in the
global financial crisis. 33
The global financial crisis also teaches us the danger of mixing politics and finance.
"Before the crisis, there was political pressure to securitize risky subprime mortgage
loans to facilitate financing for the poor." 34 We could also see the same type of political
pressure, for example, to securitize risky microfinance loans to facilitate financing for the
poor and disadvantaged. 3 5
Finally, the impact of the failure of subprime mortgage securitization should be
viewed in its larger context. Subprime mortgage loans usually constituted only a small
30. The Future ofSecuritization, supra note 15, at 1317.
31. Gary B. Gorton, The Panic of 2007 67 (Yale ICF, Working Paper No. 08-24, 2008), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=1255362.
32. The Future of Securitization, supra note 15, at 1317-18. Assessments of payment prognosis should, at
bottom, strive to be as accurate as possible. But where a prognosis has a margin of error, perhaps one should err,
in structuring transactions, on the more conservative side of that margin.
33. Id.
34. The Future of Securitization, supra note 15, at 1318; see also Understanding the Subprime Financial
Crisis, supra note 9, at 549-72 (discussing the danger of mixing politics and finance).
35. Id.
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part of the pools of financial assets backing mortgage-backed securities. 36 It was
irrational panic that caused the market prices of those securities to collapse, in many
cases arguably substantially below the intrinsic value of the mortgage loans underlying
those securities. But that collapse became a self-fulfilling prophecy by freezing the debt
markets, thereby negatively impacting the real economy and causing even prime
mortgage borrowers to lose their jobs and default. 37
B. Originate-to-Distribute Moral Hazard
As I previously indicated:
Some argue that securitization facilitated an undisciplined mortgage lending
industry. By enabling mortgage lenders to sell off loans as they were made (a
concept called "originate-to-distribute" or "originate-and-distribute"),
securitization is said to have created moral hazard since these lenders did not
have to live with the credit consequences of their loans. Mortgage underwriting
standards therefore fell, exacerbated by the fact that mortgage lenders could
make money on the volume of loans originated.38
I find the moral hazard argument weak. Mortgage underwriting standards may have
fallen, but there are other explanations. For example, lower standards may well reflect
distortions caused by the liquidity glut of that time, in which lenders competed
aggressively for business, allowed otherwise-defaulting home borrowers to refinance, and
(in the corporate lending context) even made so-called "covenant-lite" loans. The fall in
standards may also reflect conflicts of interest between lending firms and their employees
in charge of setting those standards, such as where employees were paid for booking
loans regardless of the loans' long-term performance.
Blaming the originate-to-distribute model for lower mortgage underwriting
standards also does not explain why standards were not similarly lowered for originating
non-mortgage financial assets used in other types of securitization transactions. Nor does
it explain why the ultimate beneficial owners of the mortgage loans-the investors in the
36. This was the author's experience.
37. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text (explaining the sequence of events leading to the global
financial crisis). I explain these events in more detail in Understanding the Subprime Financial Crisis, supra
note 9.
38. The Future of Securitization, supra note 15, at 1318; see, e.g., Martin Feldstein, How To Stop the
Mortgage Crisis, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 2008, at Al5, available at http://www.nber.org/
feldstein/wsj03072008.pdf (describing lax lending standards that gave rise to mortgages with loan-to-value
ratios of nearly 100% and citing the 1.8 million mortgages then in default); David Henry & Matthew Goldstein,
The Bear Flu: How It Spread, Bus. WK., Dec. 31, 2007, at 30, available at LEXIS, News Library, BUSWK
File (arguing that the distance between mortgage-loan originators and the ultimate holders of the loans
encouraged lax lending); cf John C. Dugan, Speech at The Annual Convention of The American Bankers
Association (Oct. 8, 2007), at 5, available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/speeches/2007/pub-
speech-2007-109.pdf (observing that with the increasing use of the originate-to-distribute model of lending,
lending standards shifted from evaluating the likelihood of repayment to evaluating the likelihood that the loan
could be sold). But cf Gorton, supra note 31, at 67-68 (disagreeing with this explanation, although observing
that the originate-to-distribute model and resulting moral hazard are the "dominant explanation" for the
financial panic); Effi Benmelech et al., Securitization Without Adverse Selection: The Case of CLOs, available
at http://ssm.com/abstract id=1344068 (finding, empirically, that bank loans that are securitized perform no
worse than bank loans that are held).
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mortgage-backed securities-did not govern their investments by the same strict lending
standards that they would observe but for the separation of origination and ownership.
Whatever the cause of falling mortgage underwriting standards, the originate-to-
distribute model may need fixing to avoid its perception as the cause. There is little
question, though, that the model should remain basically intact; it is critical to the
underlying funding liquidity of banks and corporations, and empirical evidence
tentatively indicates that it creates net value. 39 The goal therefore should be to minimize
any potential moral hazard resulting from the originate-to-distribute model without
undermining the model's basic utility.
There are various ways this might be done. Potential moral hazard problems could
be managed, for example, by requiring mortgage lenders and other originators to retain
some realistic risk of loss. This is the central approach of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act in the United States, which requires sellers of
securitization products to retain a minimum unhedged position in each class of securities
they sell-the so-called "skin in the game." 40
I understand that the Chinese government is taking a similar, though apparently
much stricter, approach: requiring sellers of securitization products to retain a minimum
unhedged subordinated position when they sell securities. 4 1 In comparison with U.S. law,
which makes sellers take a material risk of loss pari passu with investor risk of loss,
Chinese law makes sellers take a material risk of loss in which the sellers would suffer
their loss before investors suffer any loss. This effectively makes sellers the guarantors of
investors. It will be interesting to see whether the Chinese approach unduly discourages
the origination and selling of securitization products.
All that may be needed is to ensure that sellers' interests become better aligned with
the investors' interests, so that investors benefit from the sellers' better information. The
Dodd-Frank Act's approach should achieve that limited goal. Query, however, the extent
to which even that limited goal could create a "mutual misinformation" problem: that the
unfounded optimism of sellers who do not fully understand their product could lull
investors into buying the product.
Moral hazard problems also could be managed by regulating loan underwriting
standards. The United States took this type of approach, for example, in response to the
margin loan underwriting failures that helped trigger the Great Depression.4 2 When stock
39. See, e.g., Protecting Financial Markets, supra note 2, at 388 n.74 (citing Joseph R. Mason, Assoc.
Professor of Fin. & LeBow Research Fellow, LeBow Coll. of Bus., Drexel Univ., Mortgage Loan Modification:
Promises and Pitfalls, Presentation to the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland (Nov. 20, 2007) (presentation
notes on file with author) (showing that 58% of mortgage liquidity in the United States and 75% of mortgage
liquidity in California has come from structured finance).
40. See Dodd-Frank Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5301, 941(b), 15G (2010) (directing the SEC to require sponsors
of asset-backed securities to retain at least five percent of the credit risk of the underlying assets).
41. I have been informed that, in May 2012, People's Bank of China ("PBC"), the China Banking
Regulatory Commission, and the Ministry of Finance of the People's Republic of China jointly released a
notification, which requires that originators in securitization transactions shall retain a minimum quantity of
subordinated tranche equal to about five percent of the total issue volume of each securitization project, and that
the holding period shall not be shorter than the duration of the subordinated tranche. E-mail from Liu Xiaoli,
Assoc. at the Zhong Lun Law Firm in Beijing, and LL.M. candidate 2013, Duke Law Sch., to author (Sept. 26,
2012) (on file with author).
42. Protecting Financial Markets, supra note 2, at 389-90.
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values began depreciating in 1929, margin loans (that is, loans to purchase publicly listed
stock) became undercollateralized, resulting in a high loan default rate, which in turn
caused bank lenders to fail. 43 To protect against a recurrence of this problem, the Federal
Reserve promulgated margin regulations G, U, T, and X, requiring margin lenders to
maintain minimum two-to-one collateral coverage. 44
A similar type of approach applied to home-mortgage loans would certainly
protect against a repeat of the crisis. 4 5 That protection would come at a high price,
though, potentially impeding and increasing the cost of home ownership and imposing an
administrative burden on lenders and government monitors. 46
C. Servicing Conflicts
Mortgage securitization makes it difficult to work out problems with the underlying
mortgage loans because the beneficial owners of the loans are no longer the mortgage
lenders but a broad universe of investors in the mortgage-backed securities. Servicers
theoretically bridge the gap between investors (as beneficial owners of the loans) and the
mortgage lenders, retaining the power to restructure the underlying loans "in the best
interests" of those investors; but the reality is problematic. 4 7
Servicers may be reluctant to engage in a restructuring, for example, if there is
uncertainty whether their costs will be reimbursed; whereas foreclosure costs are
relatively minimal.48 Servicers may also prefer "foreclosure over restructuring" because
foreclosure "is more ministerial and thus has lower litigation risk." 49 Restructuring can
involve difficult decisions. For example, in a mortgage securitization transaction in which
"cash flows deriving from principal and interest are separately allocated to different
investor" classes, or tranches, "a restructuring that reduces the interest rate would
adversely affect investors in the interest-only tranche" (and likewise, a restructuring that
reduces principal would adversely affect investors in the principal-only tranche). 50
These problems can, and in the future should, be fixed. Parties should write
underlying deal documentation that sets clearer and more flexible guidelines and more
certain reimbursement procedures for loan restructuring, especially when restructuring
appears to be superior to foreclosure. 5 1 Parties also should try to minimize allocating
43. Id
44. 12 C.F.R. § 221.7(a) (2008); Protecting Financial Markets, supra note 2, at 389-90 (2008).
45. Id at 390.
46. Id There could be appropriate roles, however, for this type of approach. In the United States, for
example, mortgage lending will be strongly driven by what is known as the Qualified Mortgage (QM) definition
for making mortgage loans. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Shadow Banking, Financial Markets, and the Real Estate
Sector, 32 REv. BANKING & FIN. L. 179, 183-84 (2012). Until the definition is finalized, parties cannot estimate
credit cost or availability. Attempts to finalize the QM definition face an inherent tension, however, between
protecting borrowers while ensuring reasonable credit availability. Id. I have argued that one way to help
resolve that tension would be to allow a definitional alternative option for a QM loan, based on the loan-to-
value ratio. Id. For example, there could be a non-exclusive regulatory safe harbor if the collateral value is at
least IX times the loan principal. This would be somewhat analogous to the two-to-one margin requirement. Id.
47. Protecting Investors, supra note 2.
48. Id. at 392-93.
49. Id. at 393.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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cash flows to investors in ways that create conflicts. 52 Furthermore, I have argued that
non-conflicted servicers that engage in restructuring in good faith should be protected,
perhaps akin to the type of protection afforded corporate directors under a business
judgment rule. 53
I understand that in all major securitization transactions to date in China, the
servicers-absent their resignation or dismissal, which has never happened-are the
original owners of the loans. 54 Even where the original owners service the loans,
however, the servicing problems described above could arise. That is because these
problems result from lack of clarity about a servicer's responsibility to investors,
reimbursement standards that unfairly favor foreclosure over restructuring, conflicts
among investor rights, and exposure of servicers to investor lawsuits. On the other hand,
requiring the original owners to service the loans would not necessarily bring efficiency
if the servicing abilities of those owners are not as good as the abilities of firms that
professionally engage in servicing loans.
D. Overreliance on Mathematical Models
"To some extent the subprime crisis resulted from an abandonment of common sense
and an overreliance on complex mathematical models." 55 Models are essential to
securitization because of the need to statistically predict what future cash flows will
become available from the underlying financial assets to pay the mortgage-backed
securities. 56 There are benefits as well as hindrances to models. "Models can bring
insight and clarity. If the model is realistic and the inputted data are reliable, models can
yield accurate predictions of real events. However, if the model is unrealistic or the
inputted data are unreliable, models can be misleading-creating the danger of 'garbage
in, garbage out.' 5 7
Subprime mortgage securitization models, like value-at-risk (VaR),58 relied on
assumptions and historical data that, in retrospect, turned out to be incorrect and therefore
52. Protecting Investors, supra note 2, at 393.
53. See Steven L. Schwarcz & Gregory M. Sergi, Bond Defaults and the Dilemma of the Indenture
Trustee, 59 ALA. L. REv. 1037 (2008) (touching on the benefits of applying a business judgment rule to
indenture trustees).
54. E-mail from Liu Xiaoli, Assoc. at the Zhong Lun Law Firm in Beijing, and LL.M. candidate 2013,
Duke Law Sch., to author (Nov. 11, 2012) (on file with author).
55. The Future of Securitization, supra note 15, at 1323 (emphasis added); cf Karl S. Okamoto, After the
Bailout: Regulating Systemic Moral Hazard, 57 UCLA L. REv. 183, 211 (2009) (observing that underlying the
subprime financial crisis "was an enormous faith in the market's ability to analyze and measure risk"). Some of
the overreliance may reflect that the complexity of the mortgage-backed securities made it difficult for investors
to fully appreciate the risks they were incurring, tempting them to rely on such imperfect substitutes as rating-
agency ratings and the results of mathematical models. Cf Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, supra
note 14, at 232-40 (discussing why disclosure failed in the subprime crisis and the consequences of such
failure).
56. My use of the term "mortgage-backed securities" is meant to be illustrative, not exclusive;
securitization embraces securities backed by any form of financial assets.
57. The Future ofSecuritization, supra note 15, at 1323.
58. Dodd-Frank's attempt to fix the traditional conflict might actually backfire. Recent research by
Professor Iman Anabtawi at UCLA suggests that shareholders, even more than senior executives, want
companies to take risks.
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made the valuations incorrect. 59 The securitization models also incorrectly assumed that
housing would not depreciate in value to the levels later seen. Valuation errors were
compounded to the extent mortgage loans increasingly were made with innovative terms,
such as adjustable rates, low-to-zero down payment requirements, interest-only payment
options, and negative amortization. These terms were so complex that some borrowers
did not fully understand the risks they were incurring. "As a result, they defaulted at a
much higher rate than would be predicted by the historical mortgage-loan default rates
relied on by loan originators in extending credit." 60
Overreliance on models has also occurred when the market lacks information:
Securitization models also have been used, sometimes erroneously, to
substitute for real market information. 6 1 For example, some highly-leveraged
ABS CDO securities did not have an active trading market, so investors instead
relied on mark-to-model valuation of these securities. When assumptions
underlying the models turned out to be wrong, investors panicked because they
did not know what the securities were worth.62
It is nonetheless important to keep in mind that overreliance can be at least partly self-
correcting:
In theory, this overreliance on mathematical models is self-correcting
because the global financial crisis, by its very existence, has shaken faith in the
market's ability to analyze and measure risk through models. 63 Securitization
products are likely to be confined, at least in the near future, to those that can
be robustly modeled. The only question will be the longevity of the lesson that
future risks cannot always be predicted through mathematical models.64
59. Protecting Financial Markets, supra note 2, at 398; see also Eugene Ludwig, Founder and CEO,
Promontory Fin. Grp., 10th William Taylor Memorial Lecture at the International Conference of Banking
Supervisors 3 (transcript available at http://dev.promontory.com/assets/0/78/110/l12/79f60323-36f6-4983-
babd-61274cl7c373.pdf) (stating that "it is widely accepted" now that the subprime mortgage securitization
models used by rating agencies and other market participants relied on "insufficient data and faulty
assumptions"); The Future ofSecuritization, supra note 15, at 1323.
60. The Future of Securitization, supra note 15, at 1324; cf Subprime Mortgage Market Turmoil:
Examining the Role of Securitization: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Securities, Insurance and
Investments, 110th Cong. 3-4 (2007) (statement of Kurt Eggert, Professor of Law, Chapman Univ. Sch. of
Law), available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/ files/eggert.pdf; Edward Golding et al., Imperfect
Information and the Housing Finance Crisis, JOINT CENTER FOR HoUsING STUD. HARV. U. (Feb. 1, 2008),
http://www.jchs.harvard.edulsites/jchs.harvard.edulfiles/ucc08-6_golding green-mcmanus.pdf.
61. The Future ofSecuritization, supra note 15, at 1324.
62. Id.
63. Cf Okamoto, supra note 55, at 211 (discussing the overreliance on faulty risk models by investors);
Larry Light, Bondholder Beware: Value Subject To Change Without Notice, Bus. WK., Mar. 29, 1993, at 34,
available at http://www.businessweek.com/stories/1993-03-28/bondholder-beware-value-subject-to-change-
without-notice (discussing that within years after the Marriott "split," investors favor higher interest rates over
"event-risk" covenants, once the examples of events justifying the covenants have receded in memory).
64. The Future of Securitization, supra note 15, at 1324.
138 [Vol. 39: 1
Securitization, Structured Finance, and Covered Bonds
E. Overreliance on Rating-Agency Ratings
A fifth possible flaw is that investors in securitization transactions overrelied on
rating-agency ratings. 6 5 This calls into question the extent of appropriate reliance on
ratings, and indeed the integrity of the ratings process itself. Although I do not have time
to engage in a complete analysis of these issues, I would like to address at least two
matters that are currently under discussion in China: the requirement of dual credit
ratings for securitization projects and the encouragement of an investor-payment model
for rating-agency fees.
At the outset, however, we need to remember that while rating agencies may not be
perfect, the idea of rating agencies is important. Investors individually face relatively
high costs to assess the creditworthiness of complex securities. Rating agencies can make
this assessment on behalf of many investors, thereby achieving an economy of scale.
1. Dual Credit Ratings
I understand that Chinese government regulations are beginning to impose a
requirement of dual credit ratings for securities issued in securitization transactions. The
idea, apparently, is that two ratings are more likely to accurately reflect credit risk on the
securities than a single rating. 66 Although I may be misinformed, I am unaware of any
similar legal requirements in the United States. It is not unusual, in my experience, for
investors or underwriters to require dual ratings as a market condition, especially in
public securitizations. Indeed, I would have thought that markets themselves are good
indicators of when dual ratings are appropriate. A mandatory legal rule appears
unnecessarily costly, effectively imposing two rating-agency fees rather than one, even
when one rating-and thus one fee-would be sufficient.
The requirement of dual ratings should also be viewed from the perspective of the
global financial crisis. Even if, prior to the crisis, the law required dual ratings for
securities issued in securitization transactions, that would not have made a difference
because all of the major rating agencies failed to foresee the problem. The real problem is
that credit ratings are judgment calls made by human beings, and humans inevitably
make mistakes and often tend to engage in herd behavior.67
65. For an analysis of the integrity of the rating process and of the extent that investors should
appropriately rely on ratings, see Protecting Financial Markets, supra note 2, at 381. For an introduction to
ratings, rating agencies, and the rating process, see Private Ordering of Public Markets, supra note 17, at 2-5,
8.
66. E-mail from Liu Xiaoli, supra note 54.
67. From another perspective, one might argue that rating agencies should be more conservative, or that
government should mandate more conservative ratings. Overprotection, however, has a cost. If rating agencies
had used more conservative models requiring greater overcollateralization, those models would have been
decried as wasteful if housing prices had not collapsed.
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2. Investor Payment ofRating-Agency Fees
Issuers of securities, including securities issued in securitization transactions,
normally pay rating agencies for rating those securities. 68 This suggests that rating
agencies may have assigned artificially high ratings due to conflicts of interest regarding
compensation. On a technical level, of course, an issuer-pay model does create a conflict
of interest. That conflict, however, may not be material because ratings are determined
independently of the fee received. 69 Furthermore, the reputational cost of a bad rating
usually far exceeds the income received by giving the rating. 70
For some types of mortgage securitization transactions, though, the conflict may
have been more material than normal because ratings were given to numerous issuances
of CDO and ABS CDO securities, with each issuance (and rating) earning a separate fee.
Assuming arguendo this created a material conflict, there is no easy solution. The
question of who pays for a rating is difficult. Historically, rating agencies made their
money by selling subscriptions, but that may not generate sufficient revenue to allow
rating agencies to hire the top-flight analysts needed to rate complex deals.
More to the point, I do not believe an investor-pay model is the solution. Even if
there were an easy way to get investors to pay for ratings, that might create the opposite
incentive: to err on the side of low ratings in order to increase the rate of return to
investors, thereby increasing the cost of credit to firms issuing the securities.
IV. THE FUTURE OF SECURITIZATION
A. General Observations
Because securitization, properly utilized, is an efficient financial tool, its future
should be assured no matter how investors or politicians might temporarily overreact.
Nonetheless, in the near future at least, it is likely that securitization transactions will
need to refocus on basic structures and asset types in order to attract investors.
To this end, there likely will (and, I believe, should) be an emphasis on cash-flow
securitizations in which there are the traditional "two-ways out." An example of this
would be the securitization of prime mortgages, in which payment can come from the
borrower or the collateral. Furthermore, we are not likely to see many highly complex
securitization products, like ABS CDO transactions, which magnify leverage. I
understand that securitization projects in China have never gotten as complicated as these
types of products,7 1 and that is certainly healthy. Nevertheless, I wonder whether China
has gone too far in controlling the complexity of securitization.
For example, I have been informed that most Chinese securitization transactions do
not use any external credit enhancement or liquidity support methods. 72 From a societal
perspective, however, credit enhancement more efficiently allocates risk by shifting risk
68. Private Ordering of Public Markets, supra note 17, at 15.
69. Id. at 16.
70. Id. at 14.
71. E-mail from Liu Xiaoli, supra note 54.
72. E-mail from Liu Xiaoli, supra note 41.
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to parties with special securitization expertise and experience-who are thereby better
able to understand and assess risks associated with securitization transactions. The more a
credit enhancer understands and accurately assesses risk (in economic terms, this is called
reducing information asymmetry), the more efficiently risk is allocated. Credit
enhancement also creates an economy-of-scale benefit: even if the expertise and
experience of some investors in a securitization transaction match that of the credit
enhancer, those investors individually may not have sufficiently large investments at
stake to make it economically worthwhile for them to evaluate the transaction.
Similarly, liquidity support would create value by enabling the securitization of
relatively long-term financial assets funded by short-term debt securities. This is
economically advantageous to firms because the interest rate on short-term debt is usually
lower than that on long-term debt.73 For example, asset-backed commercial paper
("ABCP") securitization conduits routinely issue short-term commercial paper to fund
long-term loans or other financial assets.
Admittedly, this can be a double-edged sword, 74 insofar as the short-term funding of
long-term projects creates an inherent risk as to whether maturing funding can be paid.75
But that risk is common in finance, even being a central characteristic of traditional
banking;76 and it is liquidity itself that best mitigates the risk.77 A primary reason for
liquidity support, as for credit enhancement, is economy of scale.7 8 Investors in short-
73. Short-term interest rates are usually lower because it is easier to assess short-term repayment risk than
long-term repayment risk. Short-term rates may also be lower because the term structure of interest rates (also
known as the yield curve) is usually increasing despite the fact that it represents the risk-free rate for various
horizons.
74. That is, it has benefits but potential liabilities.
75. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Shadows: Financial Regulation and Responsibility Failure
70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1781, 1806 (discussing the risks and consequences if the firm defaults on paying
debt); cf Kyle Glazier, Bernanke: Financial Crisis Was a Structural Failure, BOND BUYER (Apr. 16, 2012),
http//www.bondbuyer.com/news/Bernanke-speech-financial-crisis-structural-failure-1038520-
1 .html?partner=sifna (quoting Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben Bernanke as saying that "a key
vulnerability of the [disintermediated or "shadow" financial] system was the heavy reliance ... on various
forms of short-term wholesale funding"); Viral V. Acharya & S. Viswanathan, Leverage, Moral Hazard, and
Liquidity, 66 J. FIN. 99, 103 (2011) (observing that short-term funding of long-term projects "played an
important role in the financial crisis of 2007 to 2009 and the period preceding it").
76. Structural Investment Vehicle (SIV), MONEYTERMS.CO.UK, http://www.moneyterms.co.uk/siv/ (last
visited Sept. 22, 2012) (explaining that structured investment vehicles buy long-term bonds, among others
funded by the issuance of short- or medium-term debt). The business model of ABCP conduits is very similar to
that of banks in that they borrow short-term and lend long-term. See, e.g., id. (providing a definition for
structured investment vehicle).
77. Other ways to mitigate the risk "include better standards on match-funding coverage, better internal
controls on collateral valuation and margining policies, and internalizing externalities (such as mandating
privately funded systemic risk funds)." Regulating Shadows, supra note 75, at 33 n.153. The international Basel
III capital accord takes a match-funding coverage approach, for example, introducing a liquidity coverage
requirement that banks hold sufficient high-quality liquid assets to cover their total net cash outflows over 30
days and another requirement that banks maintain minimum yearly available amounts of stable funding. Jerome
Walker et al., Reconciling the Dodd-Frank and Basel Committee Capital Requirements, 129 BANKING L.J. 627,
631 (2012).
78. Steven L. Schwarcz, Securitization, Structured Finance and Covered Bonds, China 2012 Lecture
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term debt may not individually have large enough investments at stake to make it
economically worthwhile for them to evaluate the transaction; therefore, they cannot
accurately price the repayment risk. 79 Liquidity providers, in contrast, should have
enough at stake to make that evaluation economically worthwhile. 80
In theory, therefore, external credit enhancement and liquidity support can benefit
Chinese securitization transactions. However, in practice, the employment of these
methods in China may not be currently needed. Because securitization transactions in
China often are payable from high-quality financial assets, the issued securities can
usually be highly rated without credit enhancement. 81 Moreover, Chinese securitization
transactions rarely have publicly issued short-term funding, requiring liquidity support. 82
Nonetheless, I understand that some Chinese transactions rely on privately issued short-
term funding to support the payment of long-term assets. 83 Liquidity support could well
be a helpful innovation in those transactions.
B. Alternatives to Securitization
An often-discussed alternative to securitization is covered bonds, which have some
parallels to so-called asset-backed notes ("ABN") in China. First, I will discuss covered
bonds, comparing covered bonds with securitization. Then, I will compare covered bonds
with proposals for Chinese ABN.
1. Covered Bonds
Covered bonds have a long history in European securities markets. 84 By the end of
2008, the amount of covered bonds outstanding in Europe alone was approximately C2.38
trillion, up from E1.5 trillion in 2003. Covered bonds are relatively new, however, to U.S.
securities markets.8 5
There is no formal international convention or treaty defining covered bonds. They
are instead defined, de facto, by their characteristics. Essentially they are long-term debt
securities that are secured by specific assets of the issuer of the bonds. The assets so
constituting collateral are called "cover-pool" assets.
To the extent the cover-pool assets are insufficient to repay principal and
interest on the covered bonds, investors in the bonds have an unsecured claim
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. E-mail from Liu Xiaoli, supra note 54. Because there is no current need for credit enhancement, the
Chinese market lacks credit-enhancement firms. Id. There also may be questions under current Chinese law as
to which firms could provide credit enhancement. Banks are not allowed to provide guaranties of debt
securities. Id Financial guaranty companies are not familiar with securitization transactions, and it is uncertain
whether credit enhancement may be included in their permitted business scope. Id.
82. Id.
83. Email from Liu Xiaoli, supra note 54.
84. See Covered Bonds, supra note 2, at 563-64 (providing a general background and a detailed analysis
of covered bonds).
85. Id. at 564. The first U.S. covered bond deal was issued by Washington Mutual in September 2006.
Bank of America subsequently made a covered bond issuance in March 2007. Congress has been considering
legislating a covered bond regime to stimulate covered bond issuance, but nothing has yet been enacted. See id.
(describing Congress's intent to supplement or replace structured covered bond offerings).
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against the issuer for the insufficiency ["dual recourse"]. As with any granting
of collateral, the cover-pool assets are deemed to remain on the issuer's balance
sheet (i.e., they remain owned by the issuer) for accounting purposes. Unlike
normal collateral, however, these assets are "ring-fenced" [effectively
segregated from the issuer's estate] to give covered bondholders greater
protection in the event of the issuer's bankruptcy. Additionally, weak cover-
pool assets are required to be replaced by good-quality assets throughout the
life of the covered bonds [this requirement creates what is called a "dynamic"
cover pool], thereby maintaining a requisite level of "overcollateralization"-a
surplus of collateral value over indebtedness. To ensure this is all enforceable
by covered bondholders against other creditors of the issuer, some countries
have promulgated specific covered bond legislation (a "legislative" covered
bond regime). Absent such legislation, covered bondholders must rely on
contractual protections and related commercial law (a "structured" covered
bond regime). 86
In addition, "Covered bond and securitization transactions have significant
similarities. The most important is that both strive for bankruptcy remoteness-the goal
of protecting covered bond investors in the event of the issuer's bankruptcy. Covered
bond transactions strive to achieve bankruptcy remoteness through ring-fencing or by
legislative fiat."8 7 In Britain, Canada, and the United States, for example, ring-fencing
involves the issuer creating a bankruptcy-remote, wholly owned SPV to purchase the
cover-pool assets for the benefit of the covered bonds.8 8
Securitization transactions achieve bankruptcy remoteness by having the
company originating the receivables (the "originator") transfer those
receivables, in a "true sale" under bankruptcy law, to a bankruptcy-remote
SPV-steps that can parallel ring-fencing. Another important similarity is that
after covered bondholders are paid in full, and also after securitization investors
are paid in full, any residual value from the transferred assets is returned for the
benefit of other creditors. There are, however, several differences between
covered bonds and securitization. 89
The primary distinctions are the dynamic cover pool and that covered bonds have
dual recourse, whereas securitization constitutes non-recourse financing. "Another
distinction is that, in covered bond transactions, the cover-pool assets typically remain on
the issuer's balance sheet for accounting purposes whereas, in securitization transactions,
it has been more typical for the transfer of assets from the originator to the SPV to be
accounted for as a sale." 90
"[The] accounting distinction is somewhat artificial, however. Securitization
transactions can be-and . . . increasingly are-structured as on-balance-sheet
transactions. The absence of an accounting benefit does not undermine securitization's
86. Schwarcz, Covered Bonds, supra note 2, at 562-63.
87. Id at 571.
88. Id. at 570.
89. Id at 571.
90. Id
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key fundraising and risk-transfer functions." 9 1 The dynamic cover pool and dual recourse
distinctions, however, are more critical. To understand why, compare the impacts of
covered bonds and securitization on unsecured creditors:
In a securitization, if the overcollateralization is insufficient to repay investors,
the investors [suffer] a loss because they only have recourse to assets that the
SPV has already purchased. The pool of assets available for repayment is, in
other words, effectively fixed or static. In contrast, in covered bond
transactions, the cover pools are usually dynamic, requiring the covered bond
issuer [to] continually . . . segregate new assets as needed to maintain
overcollateralization-thereby enabling the covered bonds to continue to be
paid in priority to unsecured claims. Covered bonds also go beyond
securitization in their recourse. Whereas securitization transactions are non-
recourse, covered bonds have dual recourse. If, therefore, the [dynamic] cover-
pool assets are insufficient, covered bondholders have a recourse claim against
the issuer. That claim, being pari passu with unsecured creditor claims, would
further dilute [the recovery of the issuer's unsecured creditors]. As a result of
the dynamic cover pool and dual recourse, covered bond transactions thus shift
virtually all risk to [the issuer's unsecured creditors]. 92
The extent to which risk should be allocated so asymmetrically is an important policy
question that should be addressed by governments and market participants exploring
covered bonds as an alternative to securitization.
2. Comparing Covered Bonds with Chinese ABN
As mentioned, ABN bear some common characteristics with covered bonds. In
August 2012, China's National Association of Financial Market Institutional Investors
(NAFMII), an organization authorized by the People's Bank of China (PBC) that
exercises some supervisory power over the National Inter-Bank Bond Market (the main
bond market in China), released a guide (the "Guide") on ABN issued by non-financial
enterprises. 93
ABN essentially can be viewed as debt securities with characteristics of asset-
backed financing. The issuer of ABN has a recourse obligation to repay principal and
interest to investors in the ABN. 94 The issuer also identifies certain of its assets to back
its repayment obligation.9 5 The Guide does not dictate precise deal structures for ABN.
Instead, it provides that "[lt]he issuer of asset backed note[s] shall design [a] reasonable
deal structure, and the issuance shall not impair the interest[s] of its shareholders and
91. Covered Bonds, supra note 2, at 571-72.
92. Id. at 584-85.
93. E-mail from Liu Xiaoli, supra note 54. Note that Chinese ABN is intended to be issued by non-
financial enterprises. Covered bonds, in contrast, are usually, though not always, issued by banks. Furthermore,
I understand that Chinese ABN are intended primarily to facilitate the financing of small- and middle-sized
firms. Id. Nonetheless, the conceptual principles that I discuss are applicable regardless of what type or size of
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creditors." 96
This deferral to reasonableness appears to result from a debate concerning
promulgation of the Guide. Some parties wanted ABN to merely be debt securities
secured by the assets as collateral; other parties wanted ABN to be issued by a newly
created SPV, which (as described below in more detail) would hold and administer the
assets to support the repayment of the ABN. 97 This latter structure, the SPV model, was
patterned on covered bonds.98
Under this Chinese SPV model, the issuer would issue ABN to investors. 99 The
issuer also would transfer, as settlor, assets to the trustee of a trust-SPV in exchange for a
senior class and a residual subordinated class of trust certificates. 100 The issuer would
then transfer the senior trust certificates to investors holding the ABN, thereby effectively
securing repayment of the ABN by the assets in the trust. As consideration for receiving
the ABN and senior trust certificates, the investors would pay the issuer cash equal to the
principal amount of the ABN. The ABN thus would entitle those investors to two forms
of recourse for repayment: first, a senior claim against the trust assets; 10 1 second, a
recourse claim directly against the issuer if the trust assets are insufficient to repay the
investors. 102
Opponents of the SPV model argued, among other things, that the structure would
be unfair because investors only pay money equaling the face value of the ABN but gain
double rights. 103 To the extent those opponents thought that investors could receive
double payments, they would be logically wrong: the amounts they would be entitled to
under both forms of recourse could not, in the aggregate, exceed the principal and interest
owed to them. In other words, investors in ABN issued under the SPV model could
receive no more than the amounts they would receive if they held secured bonds. 104
The SPV model does raise an aspect of the policy question that I raised when
examining covered bonds as an alternative to securitization: whether dual recourse-
which is a feature of covered bonds and also a feature of the Chinese SPV model, though
not a feature of securitization-allocates risk too asymmetrically. 0 5 The SPV model
would be much less problematic in this regard than covered bonds, however, if the SPV
model did not also use a dynamic cover pool (which, for covered bonds, requires the
covered bond issuer to continually segregate new assets as needed to enable the covered
96. Id.
97. E-mail from Liu Xiaoli, supra note 54.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. For an explanation of trusts and trust law, see infra Part IV.B.3.
101. This senior claim would appear to be protected from the issuer's possible bankruptcy under Article 15
of China's Trust Act of 2001. See infra Part TV.B.5.
102. E-mail from Liu Xiaoli, supra note 54.
103. E-mail from Liu Xiaoli, supra note 41.
104. ABN issued under the SPV model would be more advantageous to investors than secured bonds,
however, because of the former's bankruptcy-remote structure. See supra note 101 and accompanying text
(noting that ABN issued under the SPV model are secured by senior trust certificates in the trust-SPV). That
structure would make it more likely that the ABN investors would be paid without a delay caused by the
issuer's bankruptcy.
105. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text (questioning whether dual recourse in covered bonds
unfairly shifts too much risk to an issuer's unsecured creditors).
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bonds to continue to be paid in priority to unsecured claims 1 06). 107
Finally, because the SPV model utilizes a trust-SPV as its form of business
organization, 108 it calls into question how Chinese law treats commercial trusts. That
question is especially interesting because China has a civil law system, whereas trusts are
normally associated with a common law system; the latter more often addresses the type
of divided ownership that enables separation between "beneficial" ownership by the trust
and "legal" ownership by the trustee. 109 This Article therefore closes by examining
commercial trusts under Chinese law.
3. Commercial Trusts Under Chinese Law
Although originally used in China mainly for fund management and banking
purposes, commercial trusts are increasingly being used in financial transactions.1 10 The
shift began in 2001, when China passed the Trust Act of the People's Republic of China
(the "Trust Act").11 1 This Act has made it possible to use trusts to engage in
securitization transactions. 112 The Act has also made it possible, as discussed above, to
use trusts to engage in ABN transactions. 113
106. See supra note 92 and accompanying text (observing the need for overcollateralization and
segregation in the context of covered bonds).
107. Although I initially understood that the assets settled into the trust under the Chinese SPV model of
ABN would be fixed, or static, like securitization pools, I have been informed that parties might want the
flexibility in some transactions to require additional assets to be settled into the trust if the initially settled assets
become insufficient to repay the ABN. That would purport to create the equivalent, for the Chinese SPV model
of ABN, of a covered bonds dynamic cover pool. However, I express no view, whether such additionally settled
assets would have bankruptcy protection under Article 15 of the Trust Act. Cf supra notes 101, 103 (discussing
Article 15).
108. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text (identifying a trust-SPV's trustee as the trustee of the
Chinese SPV model and the issuer as the settlor).
109. Michael Milo & Jan Smits, Trusts in Mixed Legal Systems, in TRUSTS IN MIXED LEGAL SYSTEMS 13
(J.M. Milo et al. eds., 2001) (observing that, at that time, the type of divided-ownership characteristic of
common law trusts did not exist in civil law countries); cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS ch. 1, intro note
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 1996) (noting that the trust is "peculiarly a product of the Anglo-American system");
Maurizio Lupoi, The Civil Law Trust, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 967, 969 (1999) (observing that "there is a
'common core' at the basis of the Anglo-American trust"). But cf Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The
Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 434, 444 n.31 (1998)
(citing mixed-law jurisdictions including Louisiana, Quebec, and Scotland, as well as civil law jurisdictions
including Japan, Lichtenstein, Israel, and several South American countries, that have adopted the trust).
I 10. See Charles Zen Qu, The Doctrinal Basis of Trust Principles in China's Trust Law, 38 REAL PROP.
PROB. & TR. J. 345, 349 (2003) (describing the advent of the Chinese trust and invested companies, which were
intended to provide funding for the Chinese central government and were soon utilized by banks to operate in
previously prohibited areas).
111. Id. at 347; see also Adam Hofri, Shapeless Trusts and Settlor Title Retention: An Asian Morality Play,
58 LoY. L. REv. 135, 135 (2012) (The Trust Act "created a stir in trusts scholarship by [neither requiring that
title to the trust assets vest in the trustee nor specifying another location for that title.] The Act thus permits
settlors to retain title in the trust assets despite having appointed another as trustee.").
112. See Mimi Hu, Developing Securitization Laws in China, 27 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 565, 588-90
(2008) (discussing how the Administrative Rules for Pilot Securitization of Credit Assets has impacted
securitization in China). Chinese commercial trust law also derives from regulations promulgated by the
Chinese Banking Regulatory Commission.
113. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text. Commercial trusts are being used in China in other
types of transactions. For example, real estate investment trusts (REITs) containing Chinese property are
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In common law countries, and in China as well, there is a distinction between
commercial trusts used as business organizations and the related concept of a trust
indenture. As explained below, depending on the business model, China's ABN
transactions may involve both types of trusts.
4. Trust Indentures
A trust indenture is a contractual arrangement by which a trustee, usually a financial
institution, acts as agent for one or more investors whose money is advanced as a loan to
a company. 114 In the United States, many trust indentures are entered into pursuant to the
Trust Indenture Act of 1939, which requires independent trustees to protect the interests
of investors in public offerings of bonds and other debt securities. 115 Other trust
indentures are private arrangements bargained for among sophisticated lenders, such as
insurance companies, wherein one lender acts as agent for the others.
Although trust indentures create a fiduciary relationship based on agency law, some
question whether they are actual trusts because there is ambiguity whether property is
held in trust for beneficiaries. 116 The transaction between the investors and the company
is merely a loan, and the investors' claims against the company for repayment are
monitored and enforced by the trustee as agent for the ratable benefit of the investors.
Although trust property may include choices in action such as investors' claims
for repayment, the investors and generally not the trustee are deemed to be the
holders of the loan claims that would constitute the trust assets. Nonetheless,
the trustee monitors and often maintains records to register ownership of the
loan claims, and, for administrative convenience, payments are generally made
to the trustee for the benefit of the investors. While held by the trustee, those
payments constitute trust property; and while payments are owed on the loan
claims but not yet paid to the trustee, the trust indenture might be characterized
as an instrument of trust or a promise to create a trust. A trust indenture
currently listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, and it is expected that China will soon expand the
availability of REITs beyond Hong Kong. DELOITTE, CHINA REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT HANDBOOK 51, 81
(2012), available at http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-China/Local%20Assets/Documents/Industries/
Real%20estate/cnREREIH2012_130312.pdf. REITs are special-purpose entities, organized as trusts, which
issue securities to investors and use the proceeds to invest in real-estate properties. By purchasing REIT
securities, investors can diversify to real estate without concentrated holdings, and they also gain liquidity by
having the ability to sell their securities in a REIT secondary market. One can see the loose analogy between the
REIT structure in real estate and the mutual fund structure in stock. In December 2008, the Chinese government
announced support for pilot schemes for creation of Chinese REITs (called "C-REIT"s). In 2009, a REIT
Working Group led by the Central Bank was established to develop the C-REIT regime. By 2012, the Beijing,
Tianjin, and Shanghai local governments had proposed various C-REIT products (mainly inter-bank products)
for possible approval by the State Council.
114. RICHARD T. MCDERMOTT, LEGAL ASPECTS OF CORPORATE FINANCE 144-45, 154-56 (3d ed. 2000).
115. Steven L. Schwarcz, Commercial Trusts as Business Organizations: Unraveling the Mystery, 58 Bus.
LAW. 559, 569 (2003) [hereinafter Unraveling the Mystery]; see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb (2012).
116. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2, cmt. f ("A trust involves three elements: (1) a
trustee, who holds the trust property and is subject to duties to deal with it for the benefit of one or more others;
(2) one or more beneficiaries, to whom and for whose benefit the trustee owes the duties with respect to the
trust property; and (3) trust property, which is held by the trustee for the beneficiaries.") (emphasis added).
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therefore appears to be a hybrid form of a trust.117
This same ambiguity appears to arise under Chinese trust law. The idea that a trust
can be created without trust assets is confusing, and I have been informed that it is
technically inconsistent with the Trust Act.118 Practically, however, financial regulators
appear to be accepting the practice that the issuer of bonds or other debt securities may
designate a financial institution to serve as an agent-sometimes called a bond agent-on
behalf of the investors.1 19 That agent assumes duties similar to those of an indenture
trustee in the United States. 120 Likewise, in a non-SPV model of Chinese ABN
transactions, the ABN would be issued as bonds or notes secured by collateral. 12 1
Because investors in those securities would need a representative to act on their behalf,
the issuer of the securities may need to designate a financial institution to serve as agent
for that purpose, including holding the security interest in the collateral, monitoring the
collateral, and, in case of the issuer's default, foreclosing on the collateral. 12 2 In part that
agent would be a typical bond agent with duties similar to those of an indenture trustee in
the United States. 123 I understand, however, that there is legal uncertainty in China
whether an agent may hold a security interest in collateral-or, at least, whether the agent
may be recorded on file as a security-interest holder-on behalf of third-party
creditors. 124
In Chinese securitization and SPV-model ABN transactions, the relevant business
organization is an SPV, which may be a trust. 125 Normally a trust company, which holds
117. Unraveling the Mystery, supra note 115, at 569-70.





123. See supra notes 119-120 and accompanying text.
124. E-mail from Liu Xiaoli, supra note 54. Under Chinese law, a security interest cannot be separated
from the right of payment; thus, because bondholders have the right of payment, the bondholders' agent
technically cannot hold the related security interest. Even if a bondholder entrusts his bond and the
corresponding security interest to the bond agent, some believe the bond agent cannot be recorded as the
security-interest holder. However, if a bondholder transfers his bond to a trustee, the most widely accepted
theory under Chinese law is that the trustee will become the bondholder, so the trustee can then be recorded as
the security-interest holder. Id. In contrast, it is well-settled in the United States that an agent may hold a
security interest in collateral on behalf of third-party creditors. The Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") defers
to actual practice, recognizing that commercial realities do not necessarily follow who holds title to property.
See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-202 (2012) (stating that "the provisions of this article [9] with regard to rights and
obligations apply whether title to collateral is in the secured party or the debtor"); U.C.C. § 9-202 official cmt.
no. 2 (2012) (observing that the "rights and duties of parties to a secured transaction and affected third parties
are provided in this Article [9] without reference to the location of 'title' to the collateral"); see also U.C.C. § 2-
509 official cmt. no. 1 (2012) (observing that the "underlying theory of these sections on risk of loss is the
adoption of the contractual approach rather than an arbitrary shifting of the risk with the 'property' in the
goods"); U.C.C. § 2-401 (2012) (providing that "each provision of this Article [2] with regard to the rights,
obligations and remedies of the seller, the buyer, purchasers or other third parties applies irrespective of title to
the goods except where the provision refers to such title"). The UCC thus makes it clear that a security interest
in collateral may be granted to an agent or trustee on behalf of creditors. U.C.C. § 9-102 (2012) (providing that
a "secured party" includes a "trustee, indenture trustee, agent, collateral agent, or other representative in whose
favor a security interest ... is created or provided for").
125. See supra notes 99-100, 112 and accompanying text (discussing how an issuer would transfer assets
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a trust business license, will serve as the trustee.126 Using a trust as a form of business
organization raises additional issues, discussed below.
5. Trusts Used as Business Organizations
Although traditionally used in gratuitous transactions, 127 trusts are now widely
employed (including in China) as business organizations in commercial and financial
transactions, including securitization (and soon contemplated to include ABN)
transactions. 128 In these transactions, a party (the "settlor") transfers assets to the trust in
exchange for payment.129 The settlor also typically retains a residual interest, entitling it
to retain any trust assets remaining once the business transaction is concluded. 130
Investors in the trust, as senior claimants, bargain to get their money back with
interest. 131
These steps establish a trust in which there is "a fiduciary relationship with respect
to property [the assets transferred to the trust], arising as a result of a manifestation of an
intention to create that relationship and subjecting the person who holds title to the
property [the trustee] to duties to deal with it for the benefit of' the investors.132 The trust
has certain similarities to a corporation-both forms of business organization separate
ownership by the residual beneficiaries (the settlor in case of a trust, shareholders in case
of a corporation) from management (the trustee in case of a trust, the board of directors in
case of a corporation) and impose fiduciary duties on management to act for the benefit
to the trustee of a trust-SPV, and how these trusts can engage in securitization transactions).
126. E-mail from Liu Xiaoli, supra note 54. To serve as the trustee in securitization transactions, the trust
company would need special qualification as approved by the China Banking Regulatory Commission. Id.
127. See, e.g., John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J.
625, 632 (1996) ("Trusts are gifts.").
128. Supra notes 112-113 and accompanying text; see also John H. Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust:
The Trust as an Instrument of Commerce, 107 YALE L.J. 165, 172 (1997) (noting that perhaps trillions of
dollars of mortgage, credit card, automobile, and student loan debt is financed through trusts). Trusts have also
become a primary tool for investing pension moneys. Id. at 168-69. They also are the preferred form for
structuring mutual funds. Id. at 171 (footnotes omitted); see also Jeffrey M. Laderman, Your Guide to Mutual
Funds, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 2, 1997), http://www.businessweek.com/stories/1997-02-02/your-
guide-to-mutual-funds ("In 1996, some $223 billion was handed over to equity-[mutual]-fund managers ....
It's almost as much as the gross domestic product of Sweden.").
129. See Unraveling the Mystery, supra note 115, at 562 (comparing the difference between commercial
and gratuitous trusts).
130. Id. This can be illustrated by a typical example from structured finance. A company settles a trust by
transferring financial assets to the trust in return for payment in the form of trust certificates and a bargained-for
residual interest in the trust. The company then raises funds by selling the trust certificates to capital market
investors, who buy the certificates expecting that the trust assets will generate sufficient cash to repay their
investment plus the contractual rate of retum specified in the certificates. The residual interest entitles the
company to any assets remaining in the trust once the certificates are paid in full. This residual amount can be
significant. To ensure repayment, capital market investors usually demand that the amount of assets conveyed
to the trust be well in excess of the minimum necessary to repay such investors. Alchemy, supra note 3, at 141.
The residual claim to these assets after the investors are repaid therefore is a valuable property right, which the
settlor is unwilling to give up. Id.
131. Unraveling the Mystery, supra note 115, at 563.
132. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1996). Although the Restatement itself
does not specifically address commercial trusts, see id. § 1, cmt. b, and § 5, cmt. I (discussing the use of trusts
that is not within the scope of the Restatement).
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of the investors. Similarly, both forms of business organization provide for limited
liability. For example, investors may claim (absent breach of trust) only against the trust
assets, not against personal assets of the trustee; 133 in addition, the trustee's personal
creditors may not claim against the trust assets. 134
Nonetheless, significant differences exist between trusts and corporations operating
as business organizations. To understand the differences, consider two fundamental
perspectives by which one can think about a business organization: When is the
organization seen to exist (its "legal existence")? And how is the organization governed
(its "governance" 1 35)?136
"Commercial trusts are not always recognized as having separate legal
existence."1 3 7 In contrast, "corporations almost always are recognized as having separate
existence at law."1 38
"[A] trust's lack of legal existence could be troublesome if its beneficiaries are
concerned that the settlor transferring assets to the trust might go bankrupt. If bankruptcy
law did not recognize the trust, the assets thought to be conveyed to the trust [could] still
belong to the bankrupt company." 1 39 That is, bankruptcy law would not necessarily
recognize the independence of the trust assets from the settlor.
I understand that a trust's lack of existence may be less of a bankruptcy risk in China
than in the United States. Although it has not yet been legally tested in China, the Trust
Act provides, in Article 15, that "[t]rust assets are distinguished from the settlor's other
non-entrusted assets. After the creation of a trust and under the circumstance that the
settlor [is] announced bankrupt, ... if the settlor is not the only beneficiary of the trust,
the trust shall continue, and the trust assets shall not be treated as the heritage or
liquidation assets."1 40
From the standpoint of the second perspective, governance, commercial trusts are
seen to be static entities with passive managers, the trustees of the trust.141 "This
contrasts sharply with corporations, whose managers tend to be aggressive and
133. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 204 (1959) (discussing non-liability of trustee for loss in
absence of breach of trust).
134. Id. § 266 (stating that a person to whom trustee has become liable cannot reach trust property).
Accord Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on Their Recognition art. 2, § a, Hague Conf. Private
Int'l L., http://www.hcch.net/upload/conventions/txt30de.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2013) (providing that a
trust's "assets constitute a separate fund and are not a part of the trustee's own estate").
135. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 192 (2002) (the term
"governance" is commonly used to describe an organization's "system that facilitates efficient
decisionmaking").
136. See generally Unraveling the Mystery, supra note 115 (examining a third way to think about a
business organization: what effect does the organization have on its surroundings and vice versa, or the
organization's "exogenous effects").
137. Id. at 574.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 575.
140. Translation provided by Liu Xiaoli. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xintuo Fa [Trust Law of the
People's Republic of China] (promulgated by the standing committee of the Ninth National People's Congress
at the People's Republic of China, Apr. 28, 2001, effective Oct. 1, 2001), at Article 15 (China) (the official
translation of the law is available at English.gov.cn/laws/2005-9/12/content31114.html).
141. Unraveling the Mystery, supra note 115, at 575 ("[C]ommercial trusts tend to be static entities, and
their managers (trustees) often are perceived as passive.").
Securitization, Structured Finance, and Covered Bonds
opportunistic to take advantage of business opportunities." 1 4 2 I believe this reflects the
most fundamental distinction between trusts and corporations: the degree to which assets
need to be placed at risk in order to satisfy the expectations of residual claimants.
To understand this distinction, note that in a corporation the residual claims, which
are evidenced by shares of stock, are sold to third-party investors ("shareholders"). 143
The shareholders expect a rate of return that compensates them for the money they
voluntarily put at risk.144 If that rate of return is not forthcoming, they will not invest and
the system of shareholder corporate finance would collapse. 145 Therefore, it is essential
that corporations engage in business ventures that are likely to increase their
profitability. 14 6
In contrast, "a corporation's senior claimants (its creditors) will be paid principal
and interest (the latter being their contractual rate of return) so long as the corporation is
solvent."1 47 However, allowing a solvent corporation to engage in business ventures to
increase profitability brings no benefit to creditors, whereas failure of the venture might
bring a risk of insolvency and hence loss.148 Further, "[t]he fundamental goals of a
corporation's shareholders (residual claimants) and creditors (senior claimants)" therefore
compete. 149 "Corporate law resolves these competing goals by allowing managers-the
corporation's board of directors-to take risks in order to maximize corporate
profitability (and thus shareholder return) so long as the corporation is not insolvent". 150
For this reason, the board of directors is responsible to shareholders but not creditors,
absent insolvency. 15 1
Because trust law developed when most trusts were gratuitous, not commercial, trust
law does not directly address conflicts between senior and residual claimants. In
gratuitous trusts, the expectations of the claimants, in practice, tend to be consistent: to
preserve the value of the trust assets. 152 Trust law, therefore, generally imposes a duty of
impartiality: "if a trust has two or more beneficiaries, the trustee shall act impartially."1 53
However, this duty does not always clearly inform commercial trusts, which are more









150. Id. at 576.
151. Unraveling the Mystery, supra note 115, at 576 (the board of directors is responsible, absent
insolvency, only to the shareholders and not the creditors).
152. See, e.g., IIA AUSTIN W. SCOTT & WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 176 (4th ed. 1987)
("It is the duty of the trustee to use care and skill to preserve the trust property."). For example, a gratuitous trust
with no residual claimants avoids conflict by having only senior claims. A gratuitous trust where the settlor is
the only residual claimant-as in settlor transferring a life estate in assets for the benefit of third party, with the
residual to the settlor-rarely creates a significant conflict because the settlor, unlike a corporate shareholder,
normally would not expect a risk-weighted return on its claim. Even a gratuitous trust with third-party residual
claimants does not have the degree of conflict that occurs between a corporation's creditors and shareholders.
153. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 79 (2007) (discussing both the duty of impartiality; income
productivity).
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In commercial trusts, for example, the settlor's interest, as residual claimant, is the
inverse of the beneficiary's interest, as senior claimant-that is because each dollar used
to pay the senior claimant reduces by a dollar the amount available to return to the
residual claimant. So long as there are no third-party residual investors, this conflict is
rarely problematic; a settlor-residual claimant, unlike a corporate shareholder, does not
ordinarily expect a risk-weighted return on its claim. Instead, its business goal is simply
to retain any surplus value in the trust's assets.154 Significant conflicts can occur,
however, when commercial trusts have third-party investors with different priority claims
against the trust-such as a securitization transaction where a trust sells different classes,
or "tranches," of certificates to third-party investors. It is common, for example, for such
a commercial trust to issue a dozen or more tranches, each tranche having its own relative
priority of payment. To understand the problem, consider a class of senior investors and a
class of subordinated investors that are secured by, and thus payable from, the same
collateral held by the trust.
In deciding whether and how to exercise remedies, the trustee would have to attempt
to understand and balance the interests, after default, of the senior and subordinated
investors. Even given a duty of impartiality, there is relatively little guidance on how that
should occur. The English High Court of Justice was faced with such a conflict several
years ago when Orion Finance Corporation, a huge Cayman Island structured investment
vehicle (SIV), defaulted on its payment obligations to senior investors. 155 With billions
of dollars at stake, the senior investors wanted the trustee to foreclose on the financial
assets owned by the SIV, which at the then-collapsed market prices would have yielded
barely enough money to repay the senior investors, leaving nothing for subordinated
investors. 156 That could have severely compromised the financial condition, and possibly
the ultimate viability, of the two large financial institutions that held the subordinated
securities.157
The subordinated investors, instead, wanted the trustee to delay foreclosure, hoping
to be repaid (or at least to receive some recovery) from a subsequent rise in prices of the
underlying financial assets or from collections on those assets.15 8 Neither the applicable
collateral documents (in this case, a security agreement governed by New York law) nor
the applicable foreclosure law (the New York Uniform Commercial Code) provided the
trustee with clear answers. 159
The English court held that the senior creditors had no express contractual right to
direct the trustee regarding foreclosure. 160 It also concluded, applying New York law,
that the collateral is "held for the benefit of all the Secured Parties," meaning the
154. Unraveling the Mystery, supra note 115, at 578.
155. See Bank of N.Y. v. Mont. Bd. of Invs., [2008] EWHC (Ch) 1594, [16]-[28] (Eng.), available at
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2008/1594.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2013).
156. Bank ofN.Y., [2008] EWHC (Ch) 1594 [25]-[27].
157. The author was an expert witness in this case for these financial institutions, as to matters of fiduciary
law and foreclosure law. See id. [31] (discussing that the Security Trustee served an expert report from a
professor at Fordham University).
158. See id. [27] (identifying that the subordinated creditors directed the Security Trustee to refrain from
liquidating any collateral).
159. See id. [6]-[7] (explaining the issues at stake in the case).
160. Id. [43], [55]-[56], [61].
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subordinated as well as the senior investors. 161 Thus, the trustee "is not the mere agent of
the creditors, but is required to exercise [] discretion."1 62
If this same issue were to arise in a trust governed by Chinese law, its resolution
might be different. I understand from discussions at a conference at the Shanghai Institute
of Foreign Trade, that the trustee of a Chinese trust contract may have the discretion to
quickly dispose of the trust assets in case of default, despite the possible loss this may
cause to non-senior claimants. 163 However, this issue has not yet been judicially resolved
in a disputed case. 164
As previously discussed, the dilemma of a trustee with conflicting obligations is a
real problem because of its broad scope and the fact that trustees are increasingly
resorting to litigation, with all of its associated costs, to determine their
responsibilities.165 The problem is also real because, by focusing on limiting their
liability, trustees are acting in ways that can be suboptimal for some or all of their
beneficiaries. Sometimes those suboptimal actions can have significant social costs that
extend far beyond the actual beneficiaries, such as foreclosing on defaulted securitized
residential mortgages even when a workout would create more value and preserve home
ownership. Elsewhere I have argued that existing law gives trustees little guidance on
balancing these conflicting interests of third-party investors, and that trustee-governance
law needs to evolve in order to adequately address these commercial trust issues. 166
161. Bank of. Y, [2008] EWHC (Ch) 1594, [58].
162. Id.
163. Conference on commercial trusts at Shanghai Institute of Foreign Trade (Dec. 5, 2012).
164. Id.
165. Bank ofNY, [2008] EWHC (Ch) 1594, [59].
166. See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Fiduciaries with Conflicting Obligations, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1867
(2010) (addressing the dilemma of fiduciary acting for parties who have conflicting commercial interests); see
also Schwarcz & Sergi, supra note 53 (inquiring into the standard of care for indenture trustees). The prudent
man rule of trust law generally requires the trustee "to use care and skill to preserve the trust property." 2A
AUSTIN W. Scorr, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 176 (4th ed. 1987). This is primarily a negative duty, meaning a
trustee should refrain from exposing trust beneficiaries to unreasonable risks. Thus, the trust law duty focuses
more on preserving, rather than increasing, the value of the assets held in trust. Id. § 174 (stating that "[i]n
making investments the trustee is under a duty ... [to] use the caution of one who has primarily in view the
preservation of the estate entrusted to him"). To that extent, the trustee's duties under trust law are ministerial,
requiring "minimal managerial discretion and cost." Unraveling the Mystery, supra note 115, at 581. In
contrast, the duty of corporate directors under the prudent man rule is to maximize value. As a result, trustees
are normally cautious and conservative, whereas "risk-taking decisions are central to the [corporate] director's
role." ANN. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30 introductory cmt. (2005). To encourage corporate directors to make
decisions that inherently involve risks, corporate decision making is normally protected by the business
judgment rule, which presumes rationality and thus immunizes directors against liability for losses caused by
decisions made by non-conflicted directors acting in good faith. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
§ 4.01 cmt. d (1994) (observing that the business judgment rule attempts to grant corporate directors the
flexibility necessary to fulfill their duty by engaging in "venturesome business activity"). I argue that trustees of
commercial trusts should also have the protection of a business judgment rule, at least in circumstances where
their job involves maximizing value, rather than merely preserving it. This same principle-maximizing
value-also serves as a key justification for the corporate business judgment rule.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
Securitization and associated forms of structured financing, including covered bonds
and asset-backed notes, can be valuable and efficient tools for raising financing. If
misused, however, these tools can increase financial risks, as illustrated by
securitization's role in the global financial crisis. I hope that this Article can help to add
clarity and give lessons from experience to the development of these modes of financing
in China-an extraordinary nation, facing extraordinary economic challenges and
opportunities.
